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STRUGGLING WITH SELF-DEFENSE STANDARDS 
What makes a person a “criminal,” one whom society should punish?  An 
obvious response is that a criminal is a person who breaks the law.  Therefore, 
it would appear that if a student learned the purposes of the law and identified 
the elements of an offense, the student could predict the circumstances under 
which a person’s behavior would warrant punishment.  Likewise, careful study 
should enable the student to learn the defenses to certain crimes and identify 
situations where a person should not be punished, regardless of his seemingly 
criminal behavior.  However, as a student of criminal law, I quickly realized 
the true complexity and uncertainty of this task, particularly in the context of 
self-defense. 
While the claim of self-defense initially appeared clear, careful scrutiny of 
the “reasonable person” standard and applicable case law revealed the 
numerous inconsistencies and uncertainty involved in the application of self-
defense.  Moreover, the reality of jurors’ biases, along with continuous shifting 
of societal moral norms, contributes to the difficulty of determining what 
circumstances and behavior will be viewed reasonable so as to ensure the 
success of a self-defense claim.  Ultimately, the student must learn to function 
within these limitations and to appreciate the inherent subjectivism in the 
criminal law. 
In general, “a defendant makes out a claim of self-defense when he shows 
that he was confronted by a serious threat of bodily harm or death, the threat 
was imminent, and his response was both necessary and proportionate.”1  The 
law recognizes that “if a person has no realistic choice but to use deadly force, 
then her use of such force is neither culpable nor deterrable.”2  A defendant 
will succeed on such a claim, though, only if “‘a reasonable person in 
defendant’s circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary.’”3  
Therefore, the defendant’s individual, honest belief that deadly force was 
necessary is not sufficient.  To fully appreciate this requirement and make 
legitimate arguments regarding its fulfillment, a student must recognize and 
 
 1. V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2001) (citing 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7(a)-(d) (2d ed. 1986)). 
 2. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 328 (1996). 
 3. Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man?  A Sympathetic But Critical Assessment 
of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (1998) (quoting State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1368 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1367 
understand both the objective standard and the subjective part of that standard, 
the difficulties associated with applying those standards, jurors’ biases, and 
community and societal norms. 
A purely objective standard of reasonableness forbids any non-universal 
personal characteristics of the defendant from being imputed to the “reasonable 
person.”4  The rationale for using this standard is “‘to ensure that . . . there is 
no fluctuating standard of self-control against which accused are measured.  
The governing principles are those of equality and individual responsibility, so 
that all persons are held to the same standard, notwithstanding their distinctive 
personality traits and varying capacities to achieve the standard.’”5 
While the standard prevents the consideration of certain “traits,” the 
identity of the universal “reasonable person” remains a mystery.  Further, 
“courts have slowly come to accept the widespread scholarly belief that the 
formal neutrality of the objective standard is systematically biased against the 
self-defense and provocation claims of individuals from groups that lack 
significant economic, political, and social power in American society—
particularly women, the poor, and nonwhites.”6 
A number of American courts reject the purely objective standard and 
allow the jury to consider a variety of the defendant’s personal characteristics.7  
“[V]arious courts have held that evidence of battered woman syndrome, fear 
caused by past abuse at the hands of the police or by past assaults, stress 
caused by being an immigrant from a different culture, gender-specific 
responses, and physical disabilities are relevant to a determination of 
reasonableness.”8  Ultimately, however, little guidance is available regarding 
the extent to which characteristics may be considered.  Moreover, if too many 
personal circumstances are considered, the objectiveness inquiry of the 
reasonableness requirement may be compromised. 
In addition to the issue of what characteristics the “reasonable person” 
should possess, this inquiry becomes further complicated with the issue of 
jurors’ biases.  Each juror has his own characteristics which influence his 
perspective, and thus who he views as the “reasonable person.”  Jurors have 
different sociological backgrounds and do not forget them.  As one 
commentator has pointed out, “differences inevitably affect how jurors view 
the reasonableness of a particular . . . act. . . . [D]ifferent jurors will always 
have different conceptions of what kinds of acts a ‘reasonable person’ would, 
under the right circumstances, be willing to commit.”9 
 
 4. Id. at 4. 
 5. Id. at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting R. v. Hill, [1985] S.C.R. 313, 334). 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Id. at 4-5. 
 8. Heller, supra note 3, at 5. 
 9. Id. at 53. 
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In a sense, the court and justice necessarily depend on jurors’ biases.  The 
members of the jury ultimately determine what the community will accept as 
reasonable.  “[T]he reasonable person is simply ‘a device for delivering to the 
jury, in its role as conscience of the community, the normative or value 
judgment as to the degree of moral culpability to be assigned to the particular 
offender.’”10  Realistically, however, the “conscience of the community” is not 
usually fully represented by the jury. 
“A genuinely impartial jury . . . must represent all of the groups in the 
community. . . . ‘As long as there are significant departures from the cross 
sectional goal, biased juries are the result—biased in the sense that they reflect 
a slanted view of the community they are supposed to represent.’”11  Each jury 
is composed of different people having a different standard of what is 
reasonable. 
That fact necessarily threatens objectivity, because juries are always different, 
both in terms of the jurors who constitute them and in terms of the facts of the 
cases they decide.  As a result, the outcome of any particular self-defense case 
is undecidable ex ante: different juries would, contrary to what an objective 
standard requires, decide the same case differently.12 
The jury’s determination of reasonableness may result in arguably unjust 
results that are contrary to the law’s purposes. 
Upon reading the facts of People v. Goetz,13 I predicted that the court 
would definitely deny the self-defense claim; such a claim seemed 
preposterous to me.  The relevant facts, in part, were as follows: 
  A Grand Jury has indicted defendant on attempted murder, assault, and 
other charges for having shot and wounded four youths on a New York City 
subway train after one or two of the youths approached him and asked for $5. 
  . . . Goetz was carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol loaded with five 
rounds of ammunition in a waistband holster. 
  According to Goetz’s statement, the first contact he had with the four 
youths came when Canty, sitting or lying on the bench across from him, asked 
“how are you,” to which he replied “fine.”  Shortly thereafter, Canty, followed 
by one of the other youths, walked over to the defendant and stood to his left, 
while the other two youths remained to his right, in the corner of the subway 
car.  Canty then said, “give me five dollars.”  Goetz stated that he knew from 
the smile on Canty’s face that they wanted to “play with me.”  Although he 
 
 10. Id. at 16 (quoting Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable 
Man Obsolete: A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
435, 444-46 (1981)). 
 11. Id. at 18 (one set of internal quotations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 
522, 529 n.7 (1975)). 
 12. Id. at 16. 
 13. 497 N.E.2d 41 (1986). 
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was certain that none of the youths had a gun, he had a fear, based on prior 
experiences, of being “maimed.”  Goetz then established “a pattern of fire,” 
deciding specifically to fire from left to right. His stated intention at that point 
was to “murder [the four youths], to hurt them, to make them suffer as much as 
possible.”  When Canty again requested money, Goetz stood up, drew his 
weapon, and began firing, aiming for the center of the body of each of the four.  
Goetz recalled that the first two he shot “tried to run through the crowd [but] 
they had nowhere to run.”  Goetz then turned to his right to “go after the other 
two.”  One of these two “tried to run through the wall of the train, but . . . he 
had nowhere to go.”  The other youth (Cabey) “tried pretending that he wasn’t 
with [the others]” by standing still, holding on to one of the subway hand 
straps, and not looking at Goetz.  Goetz nonetheless fired his fourth shot at 
him.  He then ran back to the first two youths to make sure they had been 
“taken care of.”  Seeing that they had both been shot, he spun back to check on 
the latter two.  Goetz noticed that the youth who had been standing still was 
now sitting on a bench and seemed unhurt.  As Goetz told the police, “I said 
‘[y]ou seem to be all right, here’s another,’” and he then fired the shot which 
severed Cabey’s spinal cord.  Goetz added that “if I was a little more under 
self-control . . . I would have put the barrel against his forehead and fired.”  He 
also admitted that “if I had had more [bullets], I would have shot them again, 
and again, and again.”14 
The first grand jury that was presented with these facts indicted Mr. Goetz 
only of possession of the weapon used in the subway shootings and possession 
of guns found in his apartment, even though the prosecutor was seeking an 
indictment for attempted murder and assault, among other charges.15  
Regardless of Mr. Goetz’s past experiences and his subjective belief, it seems 
inconceivable to conclude under these circumstances that the youths he met in 
the subway that day presented an imminent threat of deadly force; it is also 
difficult to see how Mr. Goetz’s response could be construed as “reasonable.”  
However, this is precisely the conclusion the jury reached. 
The jury determined that, at least for Mr. Goetz, with his personal 
characteristics and experiences, it is reasonable to fear four African-Americans 
on a subway in New York who ask for money and give identifiable facial 
expressions.  Under the circumstances, Mr. Goetz may have reasonably 
believed that the youths were going to rob him.  However, without the implicit 
reliance on negative stereotypes, objectively, Mr. Goetz’s response appears 
totally irrational and unreasonable.  He did not receive direct threats.  He did 
not see a weapon.  He did not attempt to handle the situation in a different 
manner. 
Goetz serves as an example of the consequences of failing to establish 
clear guidelines and standards in the identification and application of the 
 
 14. Id. at 43-44 (alterations in original). 
 15. Id. at 44-45. 
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objective standard of reasonableness.  However, Goetz also sent the message 
that the jury and a significant part of the community believed Mr. Goetz, in 
fact, acted reasonably.  Mr. Goetz had the support of “the millions who 
apparently believe[d] that they would have done precisely what he did and that 
the punks he shot got what they deserved . . . . To his public, Mr. Goetz was 
cool and calculating, showing the courage that millions of others would wish 
for themselves.”16 
Ultimately, a community is responsible for determining standards of 
reasonableness.  What will be considered reasonable necessarily depends on 
the subjective perspective of jurors.  Further, “[a]s the norms that define what 
kinds of goods are valued by a reasonable person change, so too does the law’s 
appraisal of emotions that reflect such valuations.”17  For example: 
What was once settled in the law—that marital infidelity can provoke a 
reasonable man to homicidal rage—is now contested. . . . Has the public come 
to doubt the genuineness or intensity of the cuckold’s anger?  Or does a 
substantial portion of the public now question the moral quality of this 
emotion, and hence the appropriateness of treating the cuckold’s anger as 
reasonable?18 
Another area that reflects how changes in social norms demand a 
reassessment of standards and reasonable behavior is that of battered women 
who kill their husbands.  Arguably: 
The battered woman is not a reasonably prudent person.  Her characteristics 
and personality have been severely affected by the abuse which she has 
endured.  She should not be punished for being the victim of that abuse.  
Considering her acts only in the light of a reasonable person, when through no 
fault of her own she does not qualify as one, is in essence condemning her for 
her suffering.19 
The law has an interest in keeping the law “‘based on a generally accepted 
standard of conduct applicable to all citizens alike.’”20  However, the 
difficulties associated with the “reasonable person” standard, the inherent 
biases of jurors, and the continuous changes in social norms require flexibility 
in assessing behavior.  While these factors may result in uncertainty as to what 
behavior the community will accept as reasonable, the result is unavoidable.  
Surely an objective standard is necessary to maintain general standards of the 
law.  Ultimately, a student needs an understanding and appreciation of the 
 
 16. Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 423 (1988). 
 17. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 274. 
 18. Id. at 346. 
 19. Heller, supra note 3, at 86. 
 20. Id. at 4 (quoting ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, 1949–1953, 
at 53 (1953)). 
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source of inconsistencies and difficulties in order to determine if particular 
behavior will be deemed reasonable. 
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